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ABSTRACT
The monthly FOOGO Failure Review Board meetings to monitor
the performance level in hardware development, fabrication, . and test
procedtires during the report period are summarized. 	 This failure
reporting and follow-up program is generally quite effective in isolating
and solving ` problem areas.	 Participation in the OGO E launch 'readiness
review•and• the OGO. F pre-environmental critique is reported, as well
as the design review of the Momentum Control Assembly for OGO F.
No significant problems were detected in these activities. 	 A brief re-
view of the in-orbit failure rates for the OGO spacecraft and the "trans- 	 .
matter" anomaly,. of OGO V is reported; the observed failure rates are
u generally ,lower than those used.in  prediction activities.	 A possible
source of the OGO- V transmitter diffi ,ilties and a potential solution. to ' ^ .
the problem are suggested.
A brief summary of the entire independent reliability 'assessment
y activity. on the OGO project is presented.	 .
e
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I. INTRODUCTION
This docur'i-ient concludes the report on the eighth of a series of
reliability assessments of the Orbiting Geophysical Observatories con-
ducted by Planning Research Corporation for. the Goddard Space Flight.
Center, National Aeronautics and'Space Administration: The contractual
period of the study was from .25 January .1967 to 28 June 1968. Work per-
formed during calendar year 1967 is reported in PRC R-1055; reported
herein* (PRC R-1055A) is the effort expended from 29 December 1967
to 28 June 1968.
The primary objectives of .this-'assessrnent, as with all previous
assessments, are delineated in Reference 1 and can be briefly sum-.
• marized as follows:
o	 To•provide NASA with objective and independent estimates
of OG'O spacecraft system reliability.
K o	 To as silt NASA in :establishing reliability , goals for the,
x-^
spacecraft system and major subsystems.
o To act as technical advisor to NASA in OLIO reliability
matters.
To fulfill these objectives in the eighth assessment, ' three tasks
were assigned. The 'first required a reliability ;analysis of five specific
OGO design changes implemented during the assessment period.. These
-	 analyses are reported in their entirety
.
 in PRC R-1055. The second
specified PRC attendance at. the monthly FOOGO Failure Review "Board
meetings and the provision to QSFC of comments .and recommendations
pertinent to this activity. The third task, . on-call consultingr provided
for technical services is specific reliability-problem;areas not antici=
pated at the beginning of the as
-
sessmei nt, period:
The remainder of this report is -divided into two sections, the
first of which cowers all work performed under the last two of the above
.tasks during the final 6 months of the assessment period; efforts,oc- .
r
curingunder these tasks in 1967. are reported in' PR.0 R-1055. The
i
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second section presents an overview of all independent assessment
activities, performed by PRC during the eight assessment periods be
ginning in October 1961 and terminating with this report.
1 •	 #
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• II.' ADDITIONAL EIGrHTH ASSESSMENT EFFORT
A.	 Failure Review Board Meetings
During the report period (January to Tune  1968), the eighth assess-
ment task providing for a continuous review• of the level of performance
in hardware development, fabrication, and test procedures :­4,s fulfilled,
as in the.preceding period, by attendance at, and independent reporting
of, the monthly Failure Review 'Board meetings (FRBM's) held at the
spacecraft contractor's' plant. Reporting is accomplished by means of
monthly technical letters recording PRC's observations of the FRBM's
and review of associated documentation.
In summary, specific comments. were. offered: on 20 failure re-
ports representing 8 problem areas during ti;° assessment period. For
two of the "problem" areas, the comments adduced additional support
for aposition• or action taken by the FRB; in two others, the comments .
involved suggested improvements in procedures.
For the other four problem areas, comments were of a cautionary
nature, indicating a case-by-case closure of individual failure reports
with no real resolution to the problem presented by the failures. This
procedure is probably unaviodable in some cases due to trade-offs of
time, cost, and reliability; moreover, the incidence of such cases is
quite low in relation t© the total number offailure reports processed.
'Nevertheless., it is incumbent on the independent reliability assessment
contractor to point out this situation when it exists.
These four areas representing„ problems not yet .totally , resolved
are (1) leakage of solenoid valves, (2) oscillation of the bista.bles, '(3)
tape recorder bit -dropout, and (4) yaw reaction'wheel stalled power out
of tolerance. No. pattern has been detected among the 'failure reports,
however, that would indicate the necessity for systematic program changes:
The. conduct of the meetings and. the procedures utilized .are, in general,
felt to be quite satisfactory.
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B. - Launch Readiness Review, OGO E
PRC reviewed the pertinent documentation and participated in the
launch readiness review meetinm for OGO E held at the spacecraft con-
tractor's facilities on'January 16, 17, and 18, 1968. On the basis of
the information presented during the review, and prior assessment ac-
tivities, the following comments were transmitted via technical letter.
C68-5623, dated 30 January 1968.
The overall conduct and documentation for-this review generally
conformed, to the recommendations.made by PRC (letter C67-.4373,
28 June 1967) at the conclusion of the OGO E Pre-Environmental Test
Critique and OGO D Launch Readiness Review; that is, detailed handouts
of agenda items were provided to participants l rior to the meeting, and
the discussion of "assembly histories" was focused Un problem areas.
All areas appeared to have been adequately and eff' .Aently • covered.
With respect to the discussions . of battery capacity (in relation to
maximum allowable eclipse time) and system thermal performance, it
was suggested that it might be productive to examine these two areas
together. 'If, for example, some experiments must be shut down in
eclipse because of battery capacity and during sunlight `due to thermal
problems, , rather 'detrimental effects on -the overall data gathering
function could result, even if the same experiments are not involved.
.The decision as .to which experiments to cycle is a fu,nct, 'on of the dura-
tion of shutdown, the data gathering relationships -of the cycled experi-
ment:-3, the period between eclipses and .full sunlight, experiment relia-•
bility, etc. The development of an optimal cycling strategy might be
-enhanced if.: some consideration were given to these- and other factors
under both- conditions that might require cycling. 1
C. Momentum Control Assembly Design Review
The Momentua--n Control Assembly (MCA) design review package
was briefly reviewed by PRC prior to, attendance at the design review
1 Reference 13, containing the..preliminary experiment operations plan
for OGO F, appears to have implemented th y :, intent of this recommen-
dation, particularly with respect to power. availability. 	 .
9
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meeting held on 2 April 1968. Based on the meeting and the design
review package, no significant, deficiencies in the design or implemen-
tation approach of the MCA were noted.
During the design review meeting there was some discussion con-
cerning the possible addition of a s-:^r•ies of rerlundant diodes to existing
relay coil transient suppression diodes in the Control Switching Assembly
® (CSA). The purpose of the proposed additional diodes would be to im-
prove reliability by making the failure of one diode in the shorted con-
dition harmless. On the basis of information presented, and consider-
ing the likely failure modes of these diodes, the use of additional diodes
for units of new design• or manufacture was recommended. However,
since there is no reason to believe that the present circuitry is less
reliable thwa proven spac^craft equipment, PR:C recommended against
modifying the CSA solely for the purpose of adding reciundant diodes..
D.	 Pre-Environmental Critique, OGO F
PRC reviewed the pertinent documentation and participated in the
pre-environmental critique of OGO F held at the spacecraft contractor's
. fac ilities on May 7, 8, and 9, 1 968. On the basis of the information pre-
sented during the review • a.nd prior assessment activities, the following
comments were transmitted via technical letter C68-5720, dated May
1968.
The overall conduct and documentation f r • this critique' were
gene rally. satisfactory, although distribution of the documentation prior
to the meeting would have been desira'bl'e. Coverage of all areas and
action items taken during the meeting appeared to be . adequate.
Two-,of the problem areas discussed during the meeting, however,
are such that the complexity of the phenomena involved would seem to
limit the predictability of spacecraft behavior.
,The first of these problem areas concerns the possibility of oscila
lation in the magnetic amplifier bistables. This problem was previously
mentioned in PAC letter C68- ,5710, dated 1 May 1968. A separate
l Subsequent information indicates that the 'recommended course of
action was implemented.
L
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meeting was held on May . 7 during the. course' of. the critique to discuss
the problem more fully. 	 It was concluded, from. all current evidence,
.	 that detailed knowledge of the dynamic behavior of these- units is unavail-
able, and, therefore, aasu'rance of their proper operation is Constrained
by the state of the art of rY:3gnetic amplifiers. .
A similar situation exists in the second problem area in involving
possible nonlinear interaction between the especial purpose, and wideband
transmitters first noted an OGO V..- Thisproblem w.a.s' discussed in PR.0
letter C+6.8-5684, dated 5 April 196$. 	 As* indicated in that letter, certain
unde sired. modes,of.-Operation of the varactor output staves are conceiv-
able; however ., to date, the existence of, these modes has neither been
proved 'no? disproved.
In both of these problern ,: rE,as the substitution ^^f empirical results,
for analytical understanding,. w, h le perhaps necessary, is not entirely
satisfying..' On the':other hand, both . probleins. have only " appeared spur'
adicall.y and, th•erefare, may not justify, the expenditure . of time ane funds.
necessary to. arrive at a more complete theoretical understanding.
E. 	 A s e 'sme'n •' of 2-e-rationa.1 Spdcecraft
During the assessment period, two areas. relative'to'the opera
+	 taanal.spacecraft were . briefly investigated. 	 These Were (1) the trans-
mitter anomaly noticed on OGO V and (2) observed: random.,,-catastrophic
piece-part failure' rates on all OGa spacecraft.	 The r	 Vats, previously
transmitted via technical letters are summarized'in the following two 	 h
subsections".
1.	 Transmitter Anomaly, OGO 1 V
Briefly, this anomaly., involved the los s of the 'carrier' from
the special . urpose'transmitter and a concomitant drop in'forward power
a$d ,rise In rever se power of wideband transmitter A when 'both were"
transmitting 'o ver the directional antennas., . Before the anomaly' Could
he thorotagkilgr mvestigate:d, it dsappearedo	 Somewhat later, the forward
power `of wide.band transmitter A dropped by aJactor of 1.0.
!,.
The anornaly was investigated'by PRC, primarily from the point
of view, of transmitter •int6xict on. ` It wa-s conciuded-thaW the effect of
Y j	 'interaction in` these ,t'ransrnitte=s would be to, cause unusual:rmodes of ,
IV
v
operation-due to parametric pumping in the varactor output stages.
.While the a alysis of such action is, exceedingly difficult, 'being described
by nonlinear equations with time-varying parameters; it is' evident that
the coupling of energy between the output stages must be prevented to
avoid.undesired results,., The varactor type of transmitter requires
special treatment in that this design'is more critical with respect to
interaction, between transmitters than more conventional designs'. 	 The
interactions tend- to 'make ground testing in nonanechoic surroundings
difficult due'to the effect of reflected energy. 	 The incorporation of cir-
culators or gyrators for transmitter isolation was suggested to alle'-,,riate
this problem.
2.	 Observed OGG Orbital Failure Rates
. In 'Refe'rence ' 2, observed failure ' rates based on orbital
flight data, as of . 30 • Nov^ember' 196.7 , 'of four OGO spacecraft were tab-
ulated based. on an upper 60-.percent Confidence level, for eight high-
population generic' part types.	 'These rates were compared to the results
found in Reference 3 on a: part-by-part basis at both 60- and 95- percent
eonfiderce nter:Yais. 	 The results:.of nee c ce 3 ar e
 
based on,^`ata; as
of May 1966, from a wide , variety	 operational sp4c.ecraft.	 The com. - `,of
parison is tabulated in Exhibit 1',
The correspondence in part•fai,lure rates between the two sources.
is quite goo* implying that the results are reasonably indicative,- of the
magnitude of piece-part failure rates to be expected in spacecraft de-
signed' and built prior to the 1965-1.966  time period.
:
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF ALL OGO INDEPENDENT
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENTS'
A.	 Introduction
It is. the purpose of this section -of the report to briefly summarize
the efforts of Planning Research Corporation devoted to improving the
reliability o:f" the Orbiting Geophysical Observatories. , These :efforts'
are the result of eight independent reliability assessment stxdies con-
ducted from October 1961 through June 1968.' 	 The primary objectives
of these assessments are"outlined in Reference l and Section I of this
report.
	 The elements of an independent reliability assessment which
define the .activities to be undertaken, to meet. these objectives are as.
follows:
I. '	Establish and allocate reliability goals for "the system and . .
major subsystems.
Z.	 Construct a preliminary system. reliability model.
3.	 Select generic component part failure rates,
4.:.	 Make a preliminary reliability prediction.Y	 Y lP 	 .
5. 	 Identify potential reliability. problem areas, using a failure
mode, effect, and criticality analysis-.
6.	 Construct more detailed reliability models'for potential-.*
problem areas. and exercise the se,models:with more de-
tailed component part failure. rates.
?.	 Evolve and analyze competing designs for problem areas'.
8..	 Conduct engineering 'design reviews..'
9 *	Recommend, design changes .
10.	 Periodicallg update. reliability predictions and all'ocaiions
(reflecting effect of design --ha. nges, 'etc.,) and continue to
perform detailed analyses of pote:aAial problem areas.
11. "
	
Review the development contractor's reliability. programs
• and plans.
12 	 Revie*, in detail, the d.eve	 ment contractor's reliability
efforts
13.	 Review independently ,
 the trouble and failure reports.
.14.	 Observe tests and analyze and, report on the test results.
15.	 Participate in the development contractor's design reviews.
16.	 Offer advice regarding noncompliance with specifications
and contractual requirements.
Subs'ection M.B briefly summarizes the activity of each report
period..	 General and specific benefits resulting from the independent
assessments are outlined in subsection III.C.
B.	 Summary of Efforts
1.	 First Assessment Period (October 1961-F'ebru.ary 1962)
This assessment period was devoted. primarily • to establish-
in'g the initial prediction and' allocation of OGO spacecraft reliability.
Two models were' established to predict reliability- -one based on the
classical success/failure approach; and the second and preferred .,method,-
' based on partial performance. degradation in a continuo-is manner rather
than the dichotomous treatment imposed by the classical. approach. Gen-
eral' assumptions with respect tQ the mission profile, operating pro-oe-
dares, environmental factors.. etc., were ,established, and a set of piece-
part failure rates for use in the model evaluation were designated based.'
on the best available information.
Numerical values of reliability for the major subsystems• and the
spacecraft system were .presented as a function of time using . both model=
ing approaches. 	 At the end of: one, year the preferred approach gave a
reliability of .0.25, whereas the result of the classical approach was less
than 0,01.. The assigned goad. was 0.70.
	
This goal was apportioned to the
major subsystems indicating strongly the .necessity ,
 for upgrading the re-
liability cif the ,Attitude . Control and Stabilization (ACS) and -Communication
and Data Handling (1CDH) .Subsystems.
In addition, a detailed reliability analysis of the 	 in corrimuta:tor ;k
r matrix in :the C.	w s performed, and a design tailored to the mission'' r
was recommended to replace. the ' more general design A. determination .
was. made of the average power g enerated by the solar 'C lls.under .condi
Lions of random tumbling of the.'000 spacecraft. 	 A criti que •cif the.',
07
PRC R-1055A
•	 ^	 11
spacecraft contractor's concurrent reliability .report was made designa-
ting differences 'in the modeling approach and the magnitude of assumed
failure rates. Finally, an analysis was performed trading off weight
• reduction of the structures subsystem through redesign of the appendage
deployment release mechanism against loss in' reliability.
Second Assessment Period (February 1962_SePtember 1962)
The effort in this period consisted primarily of a refinement
of the prediction activities of the first assessment period, specifically,
to bring more .realism into. the 'second assessment.
a. A number of simplifying assumptions, that, of neces-
sity, -had 
.
been made in the preliminary assessment,
were eliminated,
b. Launch and POGO effects were brought into the
assessment.
C.,
	 Each, individual subsystem assessment was more de-
tailed and incorporated the latest design changes.
d:	 Basic failure rates were revised fused on new
:hifor ration.
e.	 Both reliability models were reevaluated. to reflect
the greater depth of engineering analysis.
Compensating effects in the models resulted in no significant change in
the predicted system reliability, numerics.
An independent compilation of the OGO spacecraft parts comple-
ment was also- completed during this assessment period.
3 0	 Third Asses sme'nt.Period (September 1962-April 1963);w ^—sue. ..arm .^..^r
The third assessment . further' refined and updated the results
of the first two.assessment periods. Px 4imary emphasis was, placed. on.
increased engineering. analysis 'at: the ,subsystems level, guided by the
basic objective - of achieving a complete assessment of all . aspects of the
spacecraft, ' ' The mathematical models were revised to - include subsys-
tem interface considerations and applicable data ` arising from all avail-
Able OGO spacecraft, an,. 	 ^ 	 d subsystem testSL were incorporated into the
ft
lw
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assessment. The numerical values of predicted spacecraft reliability
resulting from the revisions were considerably lower than those derived
in the-previous assessments. . The preferred method resulted in .a value
of 11 percent, whereas the classical approach yielded a value less , than
0.1 percent.
The * spacecraft reliability goal of 0.70 for 1 year's operation was
reapportioned based on the updated information available during this as-
sessment period. The ACS and CDH subsystems were reaffirmed as
.being the weakest links in the system. Numerous recommendations for
the improvement of their inherent reliability were made.
A spacecraft weight prediction methodology was briefly investigated,
and*, the prime contractor's approach to this problem was reviewed. The
concurrent prime contractor's reliability assessments were also reviewed,
and a subsystem-by- subsystem comparison was made •with 'the PRC as -
sessments. Finally, a detailed review of the OGO solar paddle vibra-
tion test results and a computerized analysis of the revised structural,
design was accomplished.
4.	 Fourth Assessment Period (April 1963_March 1964)
In this assessment period,, attention was focused on particular
p:^ob c= areas rather'than on.spacecraft system reliability assessments.
One problem treated in great detail was the discrepancy now manifest
between the predictions of spacecraft reliability as reported, by , the
prime contractor, and. PRC. All of the available prime contractor's re-
liability reports were reviewed* and analyzed in detail, and a step-by-step.
comparative analysis was made with PRC's approach., Significant differ-_.
ences were found in the mathematical models. '(classical approach in both
cases)., ,parts complements, failure modes considered, subsystem , descrip-
tions., and failure rates:. The effects of parameter drift s creening on
failure rates were evaluated. and strongly recommended for use for tran-
sistors and die'des..
Three spacecraft -elements and one experiment were singled out for
detailed analysis. A method. of 'optimizing the assignment of command
functions to the OGO command relay matrix-was derived that basically
RPRC R-1055A
13
minimized the effort of singular command system failures and that
could be implemented with no hardware . changes-whatever. The' horizon
scanner, -in the OGO ACS, subsystem was subjected to a detailed stress
analysis focusing on the fatigue life ( launch and orbital) of the flexure-
pivot springs.. The third spacecraft element analyzed was the Power
Supply Subsystem and, in particular, the effect of certain switching
circuit modifications made to this subsystem. In conjunction with this
analysis, a review of available nickel-cadmium battery test reports -was
also conducted.. The reliability of the radio astronomy experiment flown
on the first EGO was analyzed in considerable detail. A number of recom-
mendations for reliability improvement was made; however, it was con-
eluded that the experiment reliability was consistent with the reliability
of the..spacecraft itself.
The final effort undertaken during this assessment period was an
analysis and evaluation of the operational aspects , of spacecraft system
reliability to develop a practical means of assu •ing that the maximum
"value" -is obtained from an orbiting spacecraft and particularly to de-
termine the :remedial actions that can be taken in the face of spacecraft
maafunction. Diagnostic routines and decision-action charts were gen-
erated for the CDH, ACS, Power Supply, and Thermal Control Subsystems.
5.	 Fifth Assessment Period (Ja^ary 1964-Au ust .1964)
This assessment continued the emphasis of the fourth assess-
ment.period by concentrating on engineering and reliability analyses of
specific areas in an attempt to upgrade system reliability.
With respect to, spacecraft hardware elements, a detailed analysis
of the S-50, (POGO) Power Supply Subsystem was conducted including
recommendations. for. a higher degree of redundancy, solar array require
ments versus battery depth of discharge, and solar array capability. The
POGO experiment programmer design was reviewed, and its impact on.
spacecraft and mission reliability was evaluated. Other changes simi-
larly reviewed included the use . of capacitive tachometers for . the attitude.
control reaction wheels and changes, in the universal wiring system and
command receiver frequency.
iPRC R-1 055A14
Analyses of a more general nature included the. determination of
the potential worth of a parts burn-in program , for OGO and an evaluation
of the increased reliability that could be anticipated through the use of
integrated circuits to replace discrete components in i61e OGO space-
craft. 'An investigation of the "purple plague" phenomena was also con-
ducted. Finally, a recommendIation.for a single classical OGO reliabil-
ity model was made to resolve the differences still outstanding between
the spacecraft contractor and PRC.
Finally, the failure histories of units to be integrated in OGO' A
were revie•wed'to determine their potential flight reliability. Also re-
viewed were the OGO prototype thermal vacuum and spacecraft torsional
vibration tests.
6.	 Sixth Reliability Assessment (January 1965-April 1966)
The analysis of various critical.OGO hardware elemexits
continued to playa central role in this assessment period. A .r.ather
lengthy ,and detailed analysis of the enable relay and driver circuit in
the command system was made together with a number of suggested,
alternate configurations. It was firmly recommended that no changes
be made. Due to the boom deployment. failure of OGO I, an analysis of
the boom deployment . system was undertaken resulting in a number of
design and testing recommendations. Also reviewed in some ,detail was
the ACS nongated inverter.. An alternate design approach utilizing a dig-
'ital technique was proposed that would be more stable with respect to
component. tolerance build-up and parameter drift.
In th-L; assessment period, increasing emphasis was placed'on
"manufacturing" reliability -reflected in the establishinent of the monthly
System Index Report (SIR). The SIR was established to provide a contin
uous moanitor-ing of hardware development, fabrication, and acceptance
procedures as reflected in the development contractor's failure report
summaries. Also, the failure .histories of units to be integrated in OGO
were reviewed to' determine -their ' potential flight reliability.
Finally, - a more detailed ..study was undertaken to evaluate the
potential reliability improvement to be anticipated for OGO through re-
placement of discrete components in the digital command decoder with
PRC R-1055A
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integrated circuits,. A design approach was presenied, including. specific
parts, which would reduce the decoder failure rate by a factor of one-third,
An'updating was . also made of the $-49 EGO and S-50 POGO system reliabil-
ity models and of the predictions reflecting design changes that had been inZ-
plemented .since the third assessment. The reliabilities improved only a
negligible amount and -are essentially equivalent -for the two spacecraft.
7. Seventh Assessment. Period (January 1966-December 1966)
Two major design changes were analyzed during this assess-
.	 ment period. The first of these involv ,-A a redesigned horizon scanner•
to overcome the "cold=cloud effect" noted subsequent to the launch of
OGO H. The second is referred to as. the Control Switching Assembly
• (CSA) de signed to provide a spin-up capability for OGO in the -event of
loss of three-axis attitude control and stabilization. For the horizon
scanner, the .optical, mechanical, electrical, electronic, reliability,
and system aspects 'of the redesign were as Qs'sed and compared to the
pre^ious.wideband scanner design. The modified version was found io
be superior on all counts. For the . CSA, in ^ addition to the usual failure
mode and effects analysis, the effecto  of false commands were cons d
ered, and alternate . circuits and command r elated 'improvements were
suggested.
The SIR was continued during this assessment period, and. an  anal=
ysis of the failure histories, etc. , of the units `to be integrated in the
OGO .B spacecraft was evaluated.
During this assessment period, a completely revised and simpli-
fied spacecraft, system reliability model was also formulated'.and evalu-
ated incorporating all design changes, latest state of the art in "reliability
analysis, and the results of orbiting OGO spacecraft. In conjunction
with this reassessment, and on a. consiste'vt basis with , #, - the opera-
tional reliability of OGO's'I, H, and III was evaluated through August 1966.
8. Eighth Assessment Period (January 1967 -June, 1
a.	 Design Changes
During this. period 'seven'.design changes were analyzed
to .determine their impact on subsystem and spacecraft reliability. These
changes and the . results: of the analyses are
.
 as follows:
4
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(1) Modified Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS)
for OGO's D, 'E; and F
A number of changes were incorporated into the
ACS under this modification, all designed to preclude a failure^sirrilar
to the roll channel . magnetic amplifier failure of OGO TIT. The motor
driver magnetic amplifiers, were redesigned, time delay circuits were
added to the roil and yaw reaction wheel, solar array control channels
limiting and filtering ' components were added to the low-'level and bi-
stable circuits, new valve driver circuits were provided, and mechani-
cal modifications of the solar array and OPEP drive mechanisms were
incorporated.
The analysis of these modifications indicate that all were based on
sound 'engineering principles and all , had a positive impact on spacecraft
reliability.
(2) -Modified Power Supply Subsystem (PSS) for
OGO's D, E, and F
This modification is primarily designed to pro-
vide for the` use of nickel-cadmium batteries for, all missions, rather
than utilizing silver-cadmium batteries for POGO missions, as was pre-
vioiusly,  the case. 'In addition to the battery change, the series •regula-
tors, 125°F thermal switches, and cycle relay.were eliminated from the
previous design, and battery reconditioning circuits were added. Com-
mand capability was also -augmented,
The analysis indicates that, with the possible exception of false
-command considerations, the new design is, in all"respects, equal to
or better than its pre.deceasor.
(3) Modified .Tape Recorder for OGO F
The unmodified tape. recorder accepts data from
the ,telemetry encoder at a rate of 4 kilobits per second , (kbps) -and :stores ,
these data on a magnetic.tape traveling at a speed.of 1.18 ha ches per sec-
ond. The modified recorder accepts data at an.8-kbps'`rate and drives
the tape at 2.3. 6 inches per second.
•
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When evaluated from the point of view of torque margins, bit drop-
out, and wearout, the modification appears not to preserit any new prob-
lems or to create noticeable additional hazard to the operation of the
tape recorder over that exhibited by the unmodified units.
(4) ?modified Command Distribution Unit ( CDU) for
OGO . F
This modification provides for the elimination of
CDU modules 6, 8, and 9 and their replacement with one, two, or three,
new modules, depending on the number of additional impulse commands
desired.
The analysis indicates that the probability of the modified CDU fail-
ing in such a manner as to prevent the execution of an impulse command
or cause the false execution of another impulse command is negligible.
(5) Data Switching Assembler (DSA) for OGO F.
The, purpose of the DSA is to reduce the total-
num-ber of wires required to connect certain digital experiments, located in
the appendages, to the spacecraft data handling , subsystem.. The DSA•is
an entirely new assembly for OGO F.
The results of the analysis are (1) that the probability of the DSA
failing in such a manner as to Jo se any or all of the associated experi-
ment data is essentially negligible, and (Z) that the failure effects as.o-
ciated with the DSA are straightforward and do not extend beyond the DSA
or even beyond -an individual circuit within the DSA.
(6) Spin Precision Control Assembly for OGO's
E and F, and S AT Switch for OGO E
Only a failure, mode and effect analysis was per-
formed for these two .OGO spacecraft modifications. The failure effects
are straightforward and do not extend beyond the units under consideration.
(7) Momentum Central Assembly (MCA) for OGO F
*	 The purpose of this modification is to permit a
greater degree of control flexibility than previously existed. The modi-^
fications are straightforward and present no reliability problems.
'	 PAC 'R-1055A
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b..' Other Activities
Attendance . at the Failure • Review Board meetings
(FRBM°s) and at various OGO spacecraft critiques during the :report
period revealed no problem . areas -that were not adequately deal't,with
in the framework of the..meetings. No pattern could. be 'found . that would
indicate a need: for any systematic changes in the program .for develop
ing, fabricating, testing',. or monitoring the OCO, spacecraft hardware,.
This activity -was subs Jtitut-d for'the . SIR of .the. previous two assess-
anent periods to i reprove" response time , to. prdblem areas, a.number, of
which were reported in a t^: `chnical letter during -the course of .the eighth
assessment period:
The generalized spacecraft effectiveness prediction in use at the
w	 buginnixig af^ he xeport period was `reeves uated and .found not to.•have
<been significantly altered by the design changes considered during the
period.'
Revision and. extension of the • operational assessment methodology;
•	 i	
athrough S.epteml er ' 190 was also accomplished . during this report period.
w,	 The conclusions are that the: initial o peration of OGO's I, I1, and III was
worse than antici ated, whereas 'their long-rangea -operation isbetter thinp'	 g -	 g p
w.as:expected' based on"the pr edi^^-tiVe`models.
C. " ' Advantage s
.^..
a•.
	bility As s e s s iiments
y  of the 00 In^3pendent `Rely_
It , is the ptarpose of this subsection to, list"some advantage's,. general:
and specific; , felt t6 have accrued to the 000, 'program a's ,a result of this.
4	 series of eight assessment .studies. S,ubsec 'tion UC.$1 lists. general ad
;r	vantages, . whereas 3ubsection . III.C.2 dis.cu'sses specific benefits.
1.	 General-Advantages. 6f ,an' YndeTpendent Reliability Assessment
a.	 The assessment: is. system orie te+d as contrasted with
the deyelopxnent contractor's natural emphasis on the
a
equipment or , subsystem level.
t	 b.	 Assures the use. of `an objective.(,.e. , realistic) model+
c.	 Objectively ean^anes tradti"oval or "pet" ` d.esigins a.nd •
procedures,
d•.'	 .-Identifies potential problem areas, before' they bec^rne
frozen daesigns. 	 /	 r:
v
e. Separates political from technical implications.
f. Provides detailed attention to the technical aspects of
reliability by an experienced, well-balanced to ': ',
g'.	 Provides an added incentive to , the reliability efforts
of the de-,,,,elo' ment contractor.
h.	 -Provides system effectiveness and mission decision
inputs
Is	 Provides inputs to influence design decisions and.pro-
gr.am direction through rationally based -optimization
procedures.
2.	 Some Specific Benefits. o f the OGO Assessments
'	 To identify specific benefits that have been derived • from the
OGO reliability assessments, .it is helpful to consider the conclusions
and recommendations that have been submitted. These are contained in
the published report', (References 4 through 11) thaS: document each as- -
sessment period... Not ill of these will be cited here, but' illustrative ex-
ample s will b;e discussed to bring out. the :variety of advantages that can .
be , .;r'ssociated-with these studies.
The specific benefits listed below fall into four general categories.
The first of these are recommendations that ,have,bee'n..proposed by PRC
ir. its technical advisory ca acity - and that have, acre=ly been implemented.
The second category consists of recommendations that cannot be incorpo
rated in current•designs but clearly demand consider- 	 in aollow_on
spacecraft or in second gene-ation observatories. The third category of
benefits are' study conclusions that, `although t 1hey.do not lead directly
design change recommendations, do open Grease =which' merit additional
stud}r. The benefit derived in these cases is the identification of potential
weaknesses and the justification of a searching review by the spacecraft
contraztor or the assessment team. The final category of benefit• 
those study, results that indicate either the. -potential problem a.r rews `do not
exist or that no recommended action is . required.
Selected examples 'of specific benefits . in each categoLLy ar .e 'listed
M, the following subsections.
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a.	 IM lemented Recommendations
(1) The tone decoder within the Command Subsystem
was critically examined in Re-erence 4 {page 102). Expanded capability
of this device was recommended, and,. as "a consequence, the number of„
-available tone commands was increased during the course of a redesign.
(2) The CDH subsystem employs funnel cir%°+rite which
control the gating of both analog and digital data.  The original design of
these circuits gave unwarranted ,priority to the .digital data and_corimpro-
mised the reliability of the analog data transmission. All aspects of this 
design were -carefu]ay analyzed in Reference 4 (page 106), and suggestions
were presented for irriprovement. Subsequent drawing releases revealed
that design changes were %implemented, 4nd the problem was alleviated.
(3) An analysis of the program failure reports, re-
quired for preparation of. the 'OGO Svstem Index Reports, revealed that
the program was suffering from a possible decline in hardware quality.
The results. of thi-s analysis were. reported in the . System ,Index Report
(PRC D- l 140), dated 25 November 1965. The analysis was based on all
failure reports issued. prior , 'to= 30 September 19 65, The contractor has'
implemented a program to more closely control--the total process-of .pro
duction,, from receiving inspection to final .testing.
(4) In the course of a detailed' engineering and relia
blity study performed on tk ►,e; control switching assembly (Reference 10.),
it was recommended that a second set of relay 'contacts be .placed in ser=
,ies with an existent. set to, provide additional protection against inadvert-
ent entry into . the yaw-spin mode of operations. This suggestion was
accepted and implemented- on . both the `OGO t and OGO. D spacecraft.
(5) The modified power control unit for OGO.'s D, E,
and F incorporated a number of recommendations -resulting from the de-
jailed analysis performed by ]PRC on "this subsystem during' the fifth as--r
sessment period. These recommendations were primarily-. aimed at
achieving ' increa-sed -reliability through the provision of added, switching
z
	
capability for the.purpose of redundancy .(cross- strapping) and the elimi	 ,z
nation of certain nonessential piece parts, the failure of which could be
	
. 	 i
highly detrimental to the subsystem.
	 The recommendations are docu-
mented in Reference' 8, and the extent to which they were implemented .
is documented in Reference, 11.
b.	 Open Recommendations
(1)	 In the course. of the third assessment an analysis
was made of the relative merits of the decoding schemes in use in the
telemetry and command portion 'of the CDH.(Reference 6, pp. III. A, 251-
26'7)	 , This analysis compares the failure effects of single ,-level gating
and double-level gating in both command and telemetry applications.
	 It
is shown that the double-level scheme used in the command decoder is
i	 . better applied to the commutation function in the telemetry system. Con-
versely, the' command decoder, currently implemented with single-level
gating, would be- more reliable 'if double-level gating were used.
	
The rec-
ommendation that these schemes,-be; interchanged for the two applications
could be incorporated in later OGO models.
(2). -	 In performing'the i.^i.^ial reliability assessments
of the Command Subsystem, the question.of optimal assignment of cone-
.nd fuucti:,ns to the intersections of the CD 
	
command matrix was raised
by the assessment team.
	 The question was a natural one since a single
failure • in the CDU could, depending on the assignment used, cause com-
plete loss of otherwise redundant functions or 'similar undesirable events.
In response to this problem, a methodology was .
 developed (Reference 7)
that would, rather simply, yield near-,optinza3 assignments in the type of
Command Subsystem utilized in OG O.
	Since the methodology as related
to the relative values of the actualcommand functions, optimization must .
be performed for each. Vehicle,
(3)	 In preparing the spacecraft critiques for OGO A,
OGO B. and OGO C,, FRC discovered certain problem'areas (battery leaks,- .
OlaEP wrap-up, fatigue ^ horizon scanner testing, ^ boom deployment, etc. )
that, awhile ,not correctable for the specific s.pacecr.aft`concerned because
of time considerations, were pertinent for later spacecraft. 	 For example,
it was suggested in the OGO C reliability critique that the horizon scanner
a1
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had not been tested under conditions approximating those it would face in
flight. Since that flight, NASA has further tested scanner performance
to demonstrate that a scanner modified -to reduce the seriousness of cold
clouds would quite probably overlook cold atmospheric masses and per-
form as intended.
(4)	 A number of recommendations with respect to the
Command Distribution Unit modification were proposed by 'PRC in the .
eighth assessment period.	 These are documented in Reference 11 and.
relate to simplification of the ground selector circuits. 	 Although their
implementation is not critical from a. probabilistic viewpoint, their im-
plementation would effect. a , greater degree of simplicity and reliability.
C.	 Recommendations Suggesting Further Study
(1)	 During the fourth assessment period, PRC •.con-
triTR,^ uted to an effort to develop a practical means of ensuring that' the max-
Mum value, both scientific and 'engineering, would be obtained .from oper-
ational orbiting spacecraft.
	 This problem was 'teamed the "quick-look"
problem, and the .
 PRC contribution is documented-in Reference 7.	 Briefly,
thds e ffort consisted in `verifying a rationale and providing flow diagrams
and decision-action charts for the CGO subsystems., which would permit
the isolation of malfunctions for which remedial. action could be taken by .
ground command.
	 Further development of the quick- look concept was con-
tinued by GSF'C.
(2j'	 Two separate, studies were-undertaken to investigate
the feasibility of replacing discrete component part circuits in OGO.w,th in-
tegrated circuits.
	 The first was of a preliminary nature (Reference 8), while
the second actually redesigned a small digital. portion ^of the system (Ref-
6
erence 9).	 Both studies indicated the'fea:sibility and increased reliability
of the approach..	 The area considered in ,the redesign was . so limited how-
ever; that a considerable number of discrete component .parts were necessary
- •to^ serve as an-interface. between-the integrated circuits and the,remainder of
the system, thu
	 reducing the force of the reco,mme:-,dation.. A more ad-,
vanced study would be required to determine the optimal mix, of. integrated
circuits and discrete. part circuits in the OGO, satellites.
(3) As a rc^sult'of the boom deployment failures noted
on the fir.st OGO launch, a detailed design critique of the OGO boom de-
ployment: system was performed. The results of this, study are documented
in Reference 9. A number of design changes were suggested for further
study. Among these were the use of 'helical torsion springs to improve
the positive torque 'margins, the use -of subliming solids to ,control the
boom deployment rate, and .the use of flat electrical harnesses to reduce
bending resistance and improve repeatability. In, order to demonstrate
the utility of .any modification, a test program to determine if adequate
positive torque margin exists at all deflection angles at an ambient tem-
perature of 60°F before and after aging was suggested.
(4) In the control switching assembly- stndy noted
earlier ( Reference 10), PRC questioned the necessity of the four-timer
design of the gas 'inhibit-logic function. I.t was pointed out that if only.
two of the timers were used, it might be possible to achieve the same
operation with increased reliability. , - :Further study is required to deter-
mine if two timers would truly provide the performance desired.
d.. Recommendations for No Further Action
(1) In the process of assessing the. Structures Sub-
system, it was noted that the solar paddles appeared to be vulnerable to
damage during the launch phase of -',he mission. This was indicated in
Reference 5, and further study was recommended. Continued analysis
took the form of a mathematical model of the structure and a computer
program for - exercising the model. The results were reported in Refer
ence. 1 2 and indicated that testing should. be  conducted to ensure that stru.c
-tural difficulties would not be encountered. Testing revealed .that the prob-
lem was riot of a serious magnitude; 'however, the value of ,the study is`
evident in the special emphasis that was placed on these tests . and the im-
'proved scheduling forlthe tests,
(2). Detailed assessment efforts .in the .CDH area
uncovered the fact that a large number of diodes were being carried an
the spacecraft. but not used in the circuitry. Because the quantity of such
diodes was in excess of 1,000-,' a check on the weight, cost, and reliability
penapty was made. 'These .
 io es are `electrically unconnected parts in
y
.^Q
.	
.0
j
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standard welded circuit 'modules, and a. brief study revealed that the trade-
off involved in 'removing them did not warrant any action. This study was
beneficial, however, in that it. allayed any fears that the excess components
were exacting a disproportionate penalty on the spacecraft. These findings
were reported directly by letter (C63 * -252, dated 30 January 1963).
(3). , In one attempt to Upgrade OGO - systerh reliability,
the development contractor suggested a reconfiguration of the enable re-
lay and driver circuit in the OGO Command Subsystem. Other configura-
tions were suggested by NASA and PRC, since this circuit did appear to be
a weak link in the subsystem. Detailed analysis by PRC revealed, however,
that the unit was inherently quite reliable and that alternate configurations,
while. eliminating originally existent failure modes, only introduced others
with equal or higher, probabilities of occurrence and similar or , more det-
rimental effects on the -subsystem. Thus, it was recommended. that no
changes be madc in the enable relay and driver configuration on the basis
of improved reliability.
(4) As a part of the seventh assessment effort, PRC
.studied. the design of the advanced OGO horizon scanner. This . study in-
cli3ded operatiai i^ ^ ^c;pf es, system and -circuit.design, mechanical im
plemen-Cation ;
 performance tests, and reliability, The details. of these
studies. are documented in Referenc.e,10. No. major recommendations
were, offered since -no major problems were discovered. in any of the in-
vestigated areas. The benefit of studies such as this, aside from minor
recommendations, is in the, independent confirmation of the design quality
of a critical item in the OGO Attitude Control and Stabilization Subsystem.
(5) The eighth assessment study. of the seven modi-
fications rxentoned earlier (subsection IIhB.B.a). resulted in r%o major
recommendations for 'change; indeed, most of the. modifications were
judged to be a'significant improvement over previous designs.
y
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